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THE STRUGGLE OVER TORT REFORM AND THE 
OVERLOOKED LEGACY OF THE PROGRESSIVES 
Rachel M. Janutis* 
Some recent scholarship has focused on the origins of the current 
tort reform movement.  The scholarly account of the current tort reform 
movement depicts the current movement as a reaction to judicial 
expansion of tort rights in the 1950s and 1960s aimed at retracting those 
expanded rights.  In attempting to distinguish the 1950s and 1960s tort 
expansion from the current tort retraction, the scholarly account depicts 
the tort expansion as primarily a judicial movement led by legal 
academics devoid of any self-interest.  In contrast, this account holds out 
the current tort retraction as a mainly political movement driven by the 
economic self-interest of its proponents. Using Ohio as my primary 
example, I want to make three points about this account of tort reform.  
First, contemporary tort reform, rather than solely being a reaction to tort 
expansion in the 1950s and 1960s, is part of a continuing debate between 
corporate, professional and insurance interests on one side and consumer 
interests and the trial bar on the other side.  This debate began as early as 
the late Nineteenth Century and the interests and arguments advanced in 
the debate have remained relatively constant.  Second, contrary to the 
academic construction, there is nothing new about the political nature of 
the current tort reform debate, nor was judicial involvement in the 
development of tort law unique to tort expansion.  Rather, both sides of 
the debate have resorted to both the judicial and political branches in the 
battle over tort reform and political battles have been waged by 
interested actors on both sides. Third, as a result of this scholarly neglect 
of Progressive Era history, the debate about the validity of state tort 
reform measures has focused primarily on traditional areas of 
constitutional inquiry.  Instead, a focus on Progressive Era history would 
direct one to several Progressive Era constitutional provisions aimed at 
altering the balance of power among the legislature, the judiciary and the 
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jury with respect to common law tort remedies. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Beginning in the mid-1970s various corporate, professional and 
insurance interests began to advocate the need for what they termed “tort 
reform.”1  By tort reform, these groups mean legislative measures aimed 
at limiting the availability of relief and the amount of relief in personal 
injury actions.2  For example, these tort retractors advocate statutory 
measures limiting non-economic and punitive damages and abolishing 
joint and several liability and the collateral source rule.3  They also 
advocate statutory measures requiring arbitration, instituting screening 
panels to screen the merits of lawsuits before they were filed and 
heightening pleading requirements.4  They contend that such measures 
are needed to remedy an insurance crisis.5  They argue that an increase 
in the number of filings and in the size of jury verdicts has driven up 
insurance premiums and driven out insurance carriers in certain 
industries.  They argue that reform measures are needed to reduce 
frivolous lawsuits and, thereby, decrease insurance premiums. 
Various consumer interests and the trial bar have responded to the 
tort retractors, in part, by challenging the constitutionality of these tort 
reform measures in state courts.6  These tort expansionists have 
challenged the tort retractors’ measures under numerous state 
constitutional provisions, including due process, equal protection, 
separation of powers, right to a jury trial, special legislation prohibitions 
and open court provisions.7  They have met with mixed success before 
 
 1. See Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of 
Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 632-35 
(1988). 
 2. Robert L. Rabin, The Politics of Tort Reform, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 709, 715 (1992). 
Because both sides of the tort reform debate have cloaked themselves in the mantle of tort reform 
and because this side of the debate generally has advocated measures aimed at restricting tort rights 
and remedies, I refer to this side of the debate as “tort retractors.” 
 3. Id.; Manzer, supra note 1, at 633-35. 
 4. Manzer, supra note 1, at 635. 
 5. Rabin, supra note 2, at 715; Manzer, supra note  1, at 630. 
 6. Because these groups generally favor more expansive tort rights and remedies, I refer to 
this side of the debate as “tort expansionists.” 
 7. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So.2d 156, 158 (Ala. 1991) (challenging 
a cap on non-economic damages as violative of the right to a jury trial, due process and equal 
protection); Garhart v. Columbia/Healthone L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571, 575 (Colo. 2004) (challenging a 
cap on non-economic damages as violative of the right to a jury trial, separation of powers and 
equal protection); Smith v. Dep’t Ins., 507 So.2d 1080, 1087 (Fla. 1987) (challenging a cap on non-
economic damages as violative of the open courts protection); Kirkland v. Blaine County Med. Ctr., 
4 P.3d 1115, 1116 (Idaho 2000) (challenging a cap on non-economic damages as violative of the 
2
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state courts.8  Regardless of whether state courts uphold or strike down 
tort reform measures, the state courts’ reasoning tends to be devoid of 
any historical analysis of the origins of these state constitutional 
provisions.9 Instead, state courts have focused on other methods for 
interpreting state constitutions.10 
Ohio’s experience with tort reform has been illustrative of this 
pattern.  The Ohio General Assembly first passed the Ohio Medical 
Malpractice Act (“OMMA”) in 1975.  The OMMA made several 
changes to remedies available in medical malpractice cases and the 
practice for administering medical malpractice cases.  For example, the 
OMMA mandated arbitration, shortened the statute of limitations and 
 
right to a jury trial, special legislation prohibition and separation of powers); Best v. Taylor Mach. 
Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1063 (Ill. 1997) (challenging a cap on non-economic damages as  
violative of the right to a jury trial, special legislation prohibition and separation of powers); 
Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 107 (Md. 1992) (challenging cap on non-economic damages as 
violative of equal protection and the right to a jury trial); Phillips v. MIRAC, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 174, 
179 (Mich. 2004) (challenging a cap on non-economic damages as violative of the right to a jury 
trial, due process and equal protection); Rhyne v. Kmart Co., 594 S.E.2d 1, 7 (N.C. 2004) 
(challenging a cap on non-economic damages as violative of the right to a jury trial, separation of 
powers, due process and equal protection); Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 687 (Tex. 
1988) (challenging a cap on non-economic damages as violative of due process and the open courts 
protection); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 138 (Utah 2004) (challenging a cap on non-economic 
damages as violative of the right to a jury trial, separation of powers, due process, equal protection 
and the open courts protection); Etheridge v Med. Ctr. Hosp., 376 S.E.2d 525, 528-33 (Va. 1989) 
(challenging a cap on non-economic damages as violative of the right to a jury trial, special 
legislation prohibition, separation of powers, due process and equal protection); Ferdon v. Wisc. 
Patients’ Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 446 (Wis. 2005) (challenging a cap on non-economic 
damages as violative of equal protection). 
 8. Compare Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1116 (capping non-economic damages does not violate the 
right to a jury trial, special legislation prohibition or separation of powers in Idaho); Murphy, 601 
A.2d at 118 (capping non-economic damages does not violate equal protection or the right to a jury 
trial in Maryland); Phillips, 685 N.W.2d at 179 (capping non-economic damages does not violate 
the right to a jury trial, due process or equal protection in Michigan); Rhyne, 594 S.E.2d at 14 
(capping non-economic damages does not violate the right to a jury trial, separation of powers, due 
process or equal protection in North Carolina); with Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1081 (capping non-
economic damages violates special legislation prohibition and separation of powers in Illinois); 
Lucas, 757 S.W. 2d at 687 (capping non-economic damages violates the open courts protection in 
Texas); Ferdon, 701 N.W.2d at 468 (capping non-economic damages violates equal protection in 
Wisconsin). 
 9. See Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause 
of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1995).  (“[C]ourts which undertake to decide 
cases based upon distinct state constitutional provisions must first overcome an inconvenient and 
too-often overlooked impediment: the absence of serious historical research into the origins of these 
provisions.” ); See also David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1200, 
1205-17 (1992) (noting that state courts have only occasionally looked to the origins of open court 
protections to interpret such provisions and describing the various state court approaches to 
interpreting state open court provisions). 
 10. See Schuman, supra note 9, at 1205-17. 
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imposed a statute of repose, strengthened the required qualifications for 
medical experts, and partially abrogated the collateral source rule.11  The 
OMMA also marked the amount recoverable as non-economic damages 
to $200,000.12 
The OMMA was apparently passed in response to a perceived crisis 
in the market for malpractice insurance.  While the OMMA was pending 
before the Ohio Senate, the Ohio State Medical Association submitted a 
report to the General Assembly that concluded that “‘within the next 
several days, the number of physicians unable to continue medical 
malpractice in Ohio because of the lack of adequate malpractice 
coverage will reach crisis proportions.’”13  The preamble to the OMMA 
stated: “The reason for such necessity lies in the fact that immediate 
action is necessary to insure a continuance of health care delivery to the 
citizens of Ohio.”14 
Opponents of the OMMA challenged several of its provisions in 
Ohio courts.  By 1981, the Ohio Supreme Court had upheld the 
provisions of the Act pertaining to expert witnesses and requiring 
arbitration.15  Between 1980 and 1986 the Court issued a series of 
decisions concerning the validity of the shortened statute of limitations 
and statute of repose.16  Ultimately, the Court concluded that a four-year 
statute of repose was unconstitutional as applied to minors.17  In 1991, 
the Court confronted the constitutionality of the damage cap in Morris v. 
Savoy,18 where the Court held that the damage cap violated the due 
process protections in the Ohio Constitution.19  The Court applied 
traditional due process analysis, concluding that the cap violated due 
process because it did not bear a rational relationship to the state’s 
interest in enacting the cap.20  The Court concluded that no evidence 
established a relationship between the cap and its stated goal of reducing 
malpractice insurance premiums.21  Likewise, the Court concluded that 
 
 11. 136 OHIO LAWS, PART II 2809. 
 12. Id. at 2813. 
 13. Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 768 (Ohio 1991) (citing Gongwer News Service, Inc., 
Ohio Report (July 1, 1975)). 
 14. 136 OHIO LAWS, PART II 2809. 
 15. Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 768 n.2. 
 16. Id. at 763 n.3. 
 17. Id. (citing Schwan v.  Riverside Methodist Hosp., 452 N.E.2d 1337 (Ohio 1983)). 
 18. Id. at 765. 
 19. Id. at 771. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 770.  The Court reasoned that the cap did not bear a rational relationship to the 
stated goal of reducing medical malpractice insurance premiums.  Id.  The Court noted that the Act 
required the state Superintendent of Insurance to study several provisions of the Act to determine 
4
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the cap was arbitrary.  The Court reasoned that if the purpose was to 
benefit the public at large by ensuring health care, it was arbitrary to 
impose the cost of this goal on only the most severely injured victims of 
malpractice.22 
Writing in concurrence and dissent, one justice would have 
concluded that the damage cap also violated the right to a jury trial, the 
equal protection clause, the open courts protection and the special 
legislation prohibition in the Ohio Constitution.23 Justice Sweeney, like 
the majority, placed no emphasis on the historical underpinnings of these 
Ohio Constitution clauses. Instead, he reasoned that the right to a jury 
trial extended to the determination of damages in a malpractice case and 
that the cap substantially interfered with the jury’s ability to assess 
damages.24  Likewise, Justice Sweeney reasoned that the Ohio open 
courts provision required courts to be open specifically to provide 
redress for injuries.25  Justice Sweeney reasoned that the cap interfered 
with a party’s ability to obtain redress for injuries and, hence, violated 
the open courts provision.26 Finally, reasoning from prior precedent, 
Justice Sweeney concluded that the damage cap violated the special 
legislation prohibition.27 Justice Sweeney explained that a statute 
violates the special legislation provision when the statute limits the 
liability of a class without a rational justification.28 Justice Sweeney 
concluded that the cap limited the liability of a class of tortfeasors at the 
expense of their victims but failed to provide this same benefit to any 
other class of tortfeasors.29 
In 1996, the Ohio General Assembly passed a new tort reform 
statute.  The statute, like its predecessor, imposed a cap on non-
economic damages, limited the collateral source rule and joint and 
several liability and imposed a statute of repose, among other 
provisions.30  Additionally, the statute extended beyond medical 
 
their effect on insurance premiums.  Id.  However, the Court observed that the damage cap was not 
among those provisions to be studied.  Id.  The Court also noted that the parties to the litigation put 
forth no evidence to support a connection between damage awards and insurance premiums.  Id.  
The Court concluded that without such support the damage cap could not withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.  Id. at 771. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 777 (Sweeney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 24. Id. at 778-79. 
 25. Id. at 782-83. 
 26. Id. at 784. 
 27. Id. at 783. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. 146 OHIO LAWS, PART II 3867. 
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malpractice claims to claims for professional negligence generally, as 
well as for physical personal injury claims generally.31 
The General Assembly enacted the 1996 statute after a heated 
debate. A group of business interests known as the Ohio Alliance for 
Civil Justice was one of the strongest proponents of the statute, spending 
more than $1 million to lobby the General Assembly for its passage.32  
The Alliance and its supporters contended that the statute would help 
lower prohibitively high insurance premiums.33  Ohio trial lawyers and 
consumer activists lobbied against its passage.34 
The Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers sought a writ of prohibition 
and mandamus from the Ohio Supreme Court challenging the 
constitutionality of the Act. In Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. 
Sheward,35 the Court, as it had in Morris, struck down the Act.36 This 
time, the Court concluded that the Act violated separation of powers 
because it re-enacted provisions that the Court previously had declared 
unconstitutional and because the legislative findings purported to 
proclaim the constitutionality of the Act and “disagree” with the 
previous Ohio Supreme Court holdings.37  Unlike in Morris, the 
Sheward Court chronicled the history of the relationship between the 
judiciary and the legislature and the separation of powers in Ohio’s 
Constitutions of 1802 and 1851, concluding that the “power of 
constitutional adjudication was secured exclusively in the judiciary, 
essential to its integrity and independence, serving, fundamentally and 
intrinsically, as a check upon the other branches.”38  Specifically, the 
Court concluded that the provisions adopting statutes of repose, the 
provisions imposing a certificate of merit requirement in medical 
malpractice actions, the provisions abrogating the collateral source rule 
and provisions capping punitive and non-economic damages re-enacted 
previous laws without rectifying their constitutional infirmities and 
hence violated separation of powers.39 
In 2005, the General Assembly passed a comprehensive tort reform 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Margaret Newkirk, House OKs Tort Reform in New Vote, AKRON BEACON J., Sept. 27, 
1996, at A1. 
 33. Margaret Newkirk, Tort Reform Focus of Ohio House Vote, AKRON BEACON J. , Sept. 27, 
1996. 
 34. Newkirk, supra note 32; Newkirk, supra note 33. 
 35. 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999). 
 36. Id. at 1091. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1079. 
 39. Id. at 1085-96. 
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statute.40  Like its predecessor, the 2005 Act imposed a cap on non-
economic damages,41 limited the collateral source rule42 and joint and 
several liability43 and imposed a statute of repose,44among other 
provisions.  Additionally, the statute extended beyond medical 
malpractice claims to claims for professional negligence generally as 
well as for physical personal injury claims generally. 
Like its predecessors, the 2005 statute was enacted to remedy 
perceived insurance problems caused by excessive jury verdicts.45  The 
Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice as well as the Ohio Manufacturers 
Association, the Ohio Chamber of Commerce and the Ohio chapter of 
the National Federation of Independent Businesses were the leading 
proponents of the statute, while the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers 
advocated against the statute.46 
II.  THE SCHOLARLY ACCOUNT OF TORT REFORM 
Some recent scholarly commentary has focused on the origins of 
the current tort retraction movement.  While recognizing the tort 
retraction movement as a general reaction to tort expansion over the first 
three-quarters of the Twentieth Century,47 the commentary sets up the 
current tort retraction movement more particularly as a foil to the tort 
expansion in the 1950s and 1960s.48  This commentary depicts the 
current tort retraction movement as an attack on the tort system that is 
unprecedented in its use of the legislative process to further the 
economic interests of its proponents.  The commentary seeks to 
distinguish tort expansion from the current tort retraction and ultimately 
demonstrate the inherent superiority of tort expansion.  In so doing, this 
commentary takes a limited historical view, emphasizing the tort 
 
 40. See Am. S.B. 80, 125th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2004). 
 41. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.18 (2006). 
 42. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20. 
 43. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.32. 
 44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10. 
 45. See John Byczkowski, Ohio Sets New Lawsuit Limits, CIN. ENQUIRER, December 10, 
2004, at B1; John Byczkowski, Reform or Restriction, CIN. ENQUIRER, November 28, 2004, at B1. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and 
Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (2005) “This Article holds that tort 
retrenchment represents one manifestation of business and industrial reaction to social, political, and 
economic forces that transformed the American civil justice system during the first three quarters of 
the twentieth century.”  Id.  “Classical tort reform [of the 1970s-1991] . . . sees itself as an effort to 
correct the excesses of Progressive Era reform.” Note, “Common Sense” Legislation: The Birth of 
Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (1996). 
 48. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. 
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expansion of the 1950s and 1960s.  By limiting its focus to the 1950s 
and 1960s, this commentary is able to identify what it sees as two 
essential distinguishing characteristics of tort expansion.  First, the 
commentary describes tort expansion as primarily a judicial process.  
Second, the commentary attributes tort expansion to the work of legal 
academics.  In so doing, the commentary seeks to characterize tort 
expansion as a process driven by selfless actors devoid of any economic 
interest in tort expansion. 
Scholarly commentary distinguishing tort expansion from current 
tort retraction efforts acknowledge that the evolution of tort law began 
with Progressive Era reform measures such as workers’ compensation.  
However, this scholarship has focused on tort expansion in the 1950s 
and 1960s as the primary motivator for current tort retractors.  For 
example, while acknowledging other contributing factors, Professor 
Page depicts the current tort reform movement as a response to the 
expansion of tort rights in the 1950s and 1960s.49  Likewise, Professor 
Nockleby and student commentator Curreri posit that major tort 
expansions in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s triggered tort retraction.50 
As a result, these commentators describe tort expansion as taking 
place primarily in the courts.51  These commentators also describe tort 
expansion as driven primarily by disinterested academics.  For example, 
Professor Page recognizes that the rise of an organized trial bar after 
World War II produced “aggressive front-line pressure for judicial 
adoption of doctrines that favored plaintiffs” and “development of 
 
 49. Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 652-53 (1990) (reviewing 
PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)). 
Although the stirrings of old tort reform can be traced through the judicial decisions 
during the first half of the century, the pace did not quicken until the 1950s and 1960s.  
With an extraordinary outburst of energy, the courts recognized their new duties, 
abolished immunities, and adopted expansive rules for measuring damages.  Perhaps the 
most dramatic development was the judicial adoption of a rule of strict tort for harm 
caused by defective, unreasonably dangerous products. 
Id. 
 50. See Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 47, at 1026-33 (describing the “dramatic upheaval” to 
the tort system beginning in the 1960s and three “waves of tort retrenchment” during the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s). 
 51. See id. at 1029.  “While scholars and the courts were largely responsible for shaping prior 
changes to tort law, the movement self-described as tort reform was and remains ‘fueled by the 
economic self-interest of those who perceive themselves as adversely affected by the tort system.’” 
Page, supra note 49, at 654.  “So situated, then, contemporary political battles over tort reform can 
be explicitly linked to the politics of an earlier era that at one time was confined to debates in the 
courtroom.”  Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 47, at 1024.  “Classical tort reform also differs from 
progressive reform in that it focuses on the legislative, rather than the judicial arena.” Note, 
Common Sense Legislation, supra note 47, at 1768 n.25. 
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tactical skills enabling plaintiffs to win substantial jury verdicts.”52  
However, Professor Page ultimately gives credit to legal scholars for the 
theoretical reforms advanced by the trial bar and adopted by the 
judiciary, observing that “[t]he work of legal scholars provided much of 
the theoretical framework for the old tort reform.  These scholars created 
an intellectual climate for what occurred in the 1950s and 1960s.”53 
By painting tort expansion as an intellectual movement of scholars 
and judges taking place in the courtroom and the legal academy, these 
commentators attempt to characterize the expansion of tort rights as 
unconnected to any economic interests of the actors advocating reform.  
Indeed, in emphasizing this distinction some of these scholars seek not 
only to distinguish tort expansion from current tort retraction but also to 
elevate tort expansion as superior to tort retraction.  For example, 
Professor Page concludes: 
Despite their apparent similarities, there is an important difference 
between the old and new tort reform.  The former derived inspiration 
and major impetus from the ideas of scholars and has its primary 
influence on the courts.  The latter is fueled by the economic self-
interest of those who perceive themselves as adversely affected by the 
tort system.  In essence, the new tort reform is a political attack on tort 
law in the legislative arena.54 
Moreover, in these scholarly accounts of tort expansion, business 
and corporate interests appear to be absent or at least silently 
acquiescing in this expansion of individual rights, awakening only after 
their economic interests are harmed by the tort expansion of the 1950s 
and 1960s and responding solely to those economic interests. 
III.  THE OVERLOOKED PROGRESSIVE ERA 
While this picture is accurate, it is incomplete.  As Professor Page 
ultimately concedes, the tort expansion of the 1950s and 1960s was “but 
one swing of a pendulum” and the current tort retraction may be a return 
swing seeking to “restore equilibrium.”55  However, the pendulum began 
swinging much earlier than the 1950s and 1960s.  Indeed, the pendulum 
began swinging as early as the 1890s.  A more complete review of this 
 
 52. Page, supra note 49, at 654.  Professor Page notes that the National Association of 
Claimants’ Compensation Attorneys was founded in 1946 and that the NACCA evolved over time, 
eventually reconstituting itself as the Association of Trial Lawyers in 1964.  Id. at 654 n.30. 
 53. Id. at 653-54; see also Note, Common Sense, supra note 47, at 1766. 
 54. Page, supra note 49, at 654-55. 
 55. Id. at 654. 
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evolution, including its early history, reveals that the struggle over tort 
reform has taken place in both the judicial and political branches 
throughout the history of the development of tort law.  Moreover, a more 
complete review reveals that with each swing of the pendulum 
economically interested actors were present and pushing from both sides 
in both the judicial and the political arenas. 
A.  The Political Successes of the Progressive Era Tort Expansionists 
1.  The Legislative Front 
As discussed above, the scholarly account of tort reform paints tort 
expansion as primarily a judicial process.  However, a more complete 
review of the evolution of tort law demonstrates that tort expansion has 
been a political as well as judicial process.  As early as the 1890s, the 
Progressive movement gained prominence in American politics and 
society.  The Progressive movement sought greater government 
regulation of America’s emerging industrial economy to protect workers 
and promote social welfare.56  That government regulation included, in 
part, expansion of tort rights.  Progressive Era tort expansionists did not 
resort solely to the courts in their battles for tort expansion and against 
tort retraction.  Instead, they also sought tort expansion through the 
political branches.  In fact, Progressive Era reformers succeeded in 
winning significant legislative expansion of tort rights. 
For example, the quest for safe working conditions was one of the 
hallmarks of the Progressive movement.  As a part of this, Progressive 
reformers sought better access to compensation for workers injured in 
workplace accidents.  To this end, Progressive Era reformers won 
legislative expansion of the judicially enforced common law tort rights 
of injured workers.  Traditionally, the common law recognized three 
absolute defenses to tort claims brought by employees against their 
employers for workplace accidents: (1) the fellow-servant rule which 
precluded an injured worker from recovering if his injuries were caused 
by the negligence of a co-worker rather than a superior; (2) contributory 
negligence; and (3) assumption of the risk.57  These defenses had the 
 
 56. MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, PEACEFUL REVOLUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
AMERICAN CULTURE FROM PROGRESSIVISM TO THE NEW DEAL 27 (2000); JAMES W. ELY, JR., 
RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 225 (2001); see also Rabin, supra note 2 at 710 (noting that the 
Progressive Era emphasized a wide variety of workplace reforms and produced the first wave of 
consumer health and safety legislation). 
 57. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 80 (W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. 
10
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practical effect of precluding most relief for workplace accidents.58  
Progressive Era reformers challenged these common law defenses in 
legislatures.  In response to these challenges, several state legislatures 
adopted Employers’ Liability Acts that statutorily abrogated the fellow 
servant rule in cases of injuries to railroad employees59 and employees 
working in other industries.60  Progressive efforts on this front even had 
success on a national level.  In 1906 and again in 1908, Congress 
enacted the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.61  The Act statutorily 
created a cause of action for any railroad employee injured in a 
workplace accident.  In essence, FELA abrogated the fellow servant rule 
and contributory negligence. 
Progressive Era efforts to provide better compensation to injured 
workers culminated in the replacement of the tort system with an 
administrative compensation scheme.  As a result of Progressive 
lobbying and campaigning, almost all states enacted workers’ 
compensation legislations.  Indeed, 42 of the then 48 states adopted 
workers compensation laws by 1920.62  These workers’ compensation 
statutes substituted the injured employee’s judicially enforced tort rights 
 
Keeton & David G. Owen eds., 5th ed. 1984); ELY, supra note 56, at 216; Lawrence M. Friedman 
& Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 52-58 
(1967) (chronicling the rise of the fellow-servant doctrine and the assumption of the risk defense). 
 58. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 57, at 569.  Indeed, Professor Prosser found 
these defenses so restrictive that he labeled them alternatively “the ‘unholy trinity’ of common law 
defenses, and the “three wicked sisters of the common law.”  Id. at 569, 573. 
 59. For example, the Georgia legislature passed an employers’ liability law in 1856 that 
attempted to statutorily abrogate the fellow servant rule in railroad accidents.  Iowa, Arkansas, 
Florida, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Indiana and Wisconsin passed laws abrogating the fellow servant 
rule by 1900. ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN 
STATE 1877-1917 371 (1999).  See also ELY, supra note 56 at 215; JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE 
ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF 
AMERICAN LAW 67 (2004); Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of 
Workers’ Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 791 n.42 (1982).  At least 25 states adopted laws 
abrogating the fellow servant rule, instituting comparative negligence or limiting assumption of the 
risk by 1911.  WITT, supra, at 67; Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 57 at 64.  Professor Sanders 
attributes this legislative success to the political strength of the railroad unions and also to the large 
number of railroad accidents and the public visibility of these accidents.  SANDERS, supra, at 371-
72. 
 60. SANDERS, supra note 59, at 371-72.  The Nevada legislature abrogated the fellow servant 
rule and eliminated the defense of contributory negligence in cases of injuries to miners as well as 
railroad workers.  Colorado statutorily abrogated the fellow servant rule in all cases arising from 
workplace accidents.  Id. 
 61. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1908).  The Supreme Court struck down the initial version of FELA on 
the grounds that it covered railroad employees who were not engaged in interstate commerce.  
Employers’ Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co.), 207 U.S. 463 (1908). 
 62. WITT, supra note 59, at 127. 
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for an administrative remedy funded by the employer.  Employers were 
held strictly liable under the administrative scheme. Thus, the 
administrative system afforded the worker a more guaranteed recovery 
with lower transaction costs than the tort system.  However, the 
administrative remedy awarded lesser compensation than was 
theoretically available through the tort system and the costs of the 
system were spread across all employers.  Thus, the system was less 
costly to employers. 
The Ohio experience is illustrative of this pattern.  The Ohio 
General Assembly passed employer’s liability legislation attempting to 
abrogate the common law defenses and expand employers’ liability for 
workplace accidents as early as 1890.63  The Ohio Act of April, 2 1890 
prohibited railroad operators from requiring employees to waive their 
right to sue for workplace injuries as a condition to employment or 
requiring employees to contribute to a relief association or waive their 
right to sue as a condition to receiving benefits from a relief 
association.64  The Act of 1890 also created a cause of action for railroad 
workers injured by a defect in a locomotive or any car, machinery or 
other attachments to the locomotive.65  Finally, the Act of 1890 limited 
the fellow-servant rule.  Under the fellow-servant doctrine, an employee 
could not recover from his employer if his injuries were caused by the 
negligence of a co-worker.  However, the employee could recover if his 
injuries were caused by the negligence of a superior.  The Act of 1890 
codified this rule and clarified that employees in any branch of a 
corporation were superior employees for purposes of this rule.66 
The General Assembly passed additional statutes attempting to 
abrogate the fellow-servant and assumption of the risk defenses in other 
industries.67  For example, in the Act of April 1902, the General 
Assembly further abrogated the fellow-servant rule by creating a cause 
of action for an employee who was injured due to a defect in the 
condition of any workplace machinery that the employer negligently 
 
 63. Vayto v. River Terminal, 28 Ohio Dec. 401, 404 (Ohio C.P. 1915); Stanton G. Darling II, 
History of Ohio Products Liability Law, in II THE HISTORY OF OHIO LAW 591, 596 (Michael Les 
Benedict and John F. Winkler eds., 2004). 
 64. H.B. 200, 69th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1890).  Fearful of personal injury claims, 
some railroads created employee relief associations to provide medical assistance and compensation 
to injured workers.  These relief associates were funded by contributions by employees.  Some 
railroads made contributions to the relief association mandatory.  Railroads also made waiver of suit 
against the railroad a condition to receiving benefits.  ELY, supra note 56, at 216-17. 
 65. H.B. 200, supra note 64. 
 66. Id.; Railroad Co. v. Margrat, 37 N.E. 11 (Ohio 1894). 
 67. Vayto, 28 Ohio Dec. at 404; Darling, supra note 63, at 596. 
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 4, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss4/4
JANUTISFINAL.DOC 2/26/2007  9:31:01 AM 
2006] OVERLOOKED LEGACY OF THE PROGRESSIVES 955 
failed to detect or repair even if it was a co-worker who was negligent in 
the inspection or repair of the machinery.68  In the Act of April 1904, the 
General Assembly created a cause of action for a worker who was 
injured when the employer negligently failed to guard or protect the 
machinery, appliances or workplace even if the injured worker learned 
of the defect and continued to work with the machinery or in the 
workplace after learning of the defect.69 The Act of 1904, thus, 
abrogated the assumption of the risk doctrine. 
The Ohio legislature’s efforts to alleviate the effects of the common 
law defenses culminated in the Norris Act of 1910.70  The Norris Act 
further abrogated the defenses of assumption of the risk and the fellow-
servant rule and also adopted comparative negligence in lieu of 
contributory negligence.  For example, the Norris Act clarified that any 
employee charged with inspecting or repairing the workspace or 
machinery within the workspace or transmitting warnings or instructions 
to employees was not a fellow-servant.71  The Act also prohibited 
application of the fellow-servant defense when the worker’s injuries 
were caused by the negligence of a co-worker who was following 
instructions given by the employer and when the employer failed to 
provide necessary and sufficient supervision of employees to ensure a 
safe workplace.72  The Act provided that an employee would not be 
deemed to have assumed the risk of injury if his injuries were caused by 
the negligence of a fellow-servant who was following instructions given 
by the employer, nor would an injured employee be deemed to have 
assumed the risk of injury when the employer had failed to provide 
adequate supervision to ensure a safe workplace.73  Finally, the Act 
provided that the negligence of an employee would not bar recovery 
“where his contributory negligence is slight and the negligence of the 
employer is gross in comparison.”74  The Act substituted comparative 
negligence in these situations.75 
Like other states, Ohio eventually sought to replace tort remedies 
for workplace injuries with an administrative workers’ compensation 
scheme.  The General Assembly first adopted a workers’ compensation 
 
 68. H.B. 31, 75th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1902). 
 69. H.B. 122, 67th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1904). 
 70. See Vayto, 28 Ohio Dec. at 404. 
 71. H.B. 24, 78th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1910). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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law in 1911.76  After the Ohio Constitution was amended in 1912 to 
expressly authorize the legislature to enact workers’ compensation 
legislation,77 the General Assembly adopted new legislation in March 
1913.  The new legislation strengthened the workers’ compensation 
system, in part, by making participation in the system mandatory. 
2.  The Progressive Era Constitutional Conventions 
Progressive Era reformers did not confine their political efforts to 
the state and federal legislatures.  Instead, Progressive Era reformers 
used state constitutions to expand tort rights.  Progressive Era reformers 
sought and won constitutional amendments aimed at limiting the 
legislature’s ability to curb common law torts and remedies.  Eighteen 
states convened constitutional conventions between 1870 and 1915.78  
During these conventions, Progressive Era reformers sought 
constitutional provisions aimed at expanding tort rights outright and at 
limiting the legislature’s control over common law tort actions.  For 
example, South Carolina amended its constitution in 1895 to 
constitutionally ban the fellow-servant rule.79  In several other states, 
reformers proposed and won measures prohibiting the legislature from 
adopting special statutes of limitations aimed at shortening statutes of 
limitations in lawsuits against railroads and corporations.80  Likewise, in 
many states, reformers sought measures prohibiting the legislature from 
limiting damages in personal injury and wrongful death actions.81 
 
 76. S.B. 127, 79th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1911). 
 77. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. 
 78. CYNTHIA E. BROWNE, Introduction to RICHARD H. LEACH, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTIONS FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENT UNION, 1776-1959 
xxvii-xxix (1973). 
 79. ELY, supra note 56, at 215. 
 80. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 31, art. 4, § 19 (1912) (prohibiting statutory limits on 
damages in personal injury actions and wrongful death actions and prohibiting special statutes of 
limitations); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 25 (1876) (prohibiting the legislature from enacting special 
statutes of limitation and from enacting rules of procedure for the Colorado courts). 
 81. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 31, art. 4, § 19 (prohibiting statutory limits on damages in 
personal injury actions and wrongful death actions and prohibiting special statutes of limitations); 
ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 32, art. 17, § 12 (1874) (prohibiting statutory limits on damages in personal 
injury actions and providing that railroads must be liable for injuries that they cause); COLO. CONST. 
art. V, § 25 (prohibiting the legislature from enacting special statutes of limitation and from 
enacting rules of procedure for the Colorado courts); KY. CONST. § 54 (1890) (prohibiting statutory 
limits on damages recoverable in personal injury and wrongful death actions); N.Y. CONST. art. I, 
§ 18 (1894) (prohibiting abrogation of wrongful death actions or limits on damages recoverable 
therein); OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 7 (1907) (prohibiting abrogation of wrongful death actions or 
limits on damages recoverable therein); UTAH CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (1895) (prohibiting abrogation 
of wrongful death actions or limits on damages recoverable therein). 
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Illustratively, in 1873 Pennsylvania delegates proposed and adopted 
a constitutional amendment prohibiting the legislature from limiting 
damages in personal injury and wrongful death actions and from 
shortening the statute of limitations in lawsuits against corporations.  As 
amended, Article III, Section 21 provided: 
[No act of] the general assembly [shall] limit the amount to be 
recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or 
property; and, in case of death from injuries, the right of action shall 
survive, and the general assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit 
such actions shall be prosecuted.  No act shall prescribe any limitations 
of time within which suits may be brought against the corporations for 
injuries to persons or property, or for other causes different from those 
fixed by general laws regulating actions against natural persons, and 
such acts now existing are void.82 
Progressive Era reformers sought these constitutional provisions 
expressly because they feared corporate interests’ influence in state 
legislatures.  For example, in 1891, Kentucky amended its constitution, 
in part, to prohibit the legislature from limiting the amount to be 
recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to a person or 
property83 and to provide that “[w]henever the death of a person shall 
result from an injury inflicted by negligence or wrongful act, then, in 
every such case, damages may be recovered for such death, from the 
corporations and persons so causing the same.”84  The provisions 
apparently were enacted because delegates feared that the legislature had 
granted privileges and immunities to railroads and other corporate 
interests because of their political power.85 
Ohio’s experience follows similar lines.  Ohio convened a 
 
 82. PA. CONST. art. III, § 18. 
 83. KY. CONST. § 54 (1891). 
 84. KY. CONST. § 241 (1891). 
 85. See Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 811-12 (Ky. 1991).  “[Sections] 
54 and 241 . . . were enacted along with many other provisions to limit the power of the General 
Assembly, which was then widely perceived as abusing its power with the grant of privileges and 
immunities to railroads and other powerful corporate interests.”  See Debates, Constitutional 
Convention of 1890, Vol 4. 
‘Most of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention felt that the real root of 
Kentucky’s governmental problems was the almost unlimited power of the General 
Assembly. One of them even said that ‘. . . the principal, if not the sole purpose of the 
constitution which we are here to frame, is to restrain its [the Legislature’s] will and 
restrict its authority. . . .’ They distrusted the General Assembly, so they wrote many 
details of law into the Constitution.’ p. 161, Research Report No. 137, Legislative 
Research Commission, Jan. 1987. 
Id. 
15
Janutis: Overlooked Legacy of the Progressives
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006
JANUTISFINAL.DOC 2/26/2007  9:31:01 AM 
958 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:943 
constitutional convention in 1912.  Delegates to the convention 
ultimately adopted Proposal 240 prohibiting the legislature from 
imposing statutory limits on the amount of damages recoverable in 
wrongful death actions.  As originally submitted, Proposal 240 also 
would have expressly prohibited the legislature from abrogating the right 
of action in wrongful death cases.86  Comments of the delegates reveal 
that at least some of the delegates supported Proposal 240 specifically 
because the Ohio General Assembly had passed legislation that reduced 
mining companies’ liability in wrongful death actions.87  In opposing an 
amendment to Proposal 240 which eliminated the prohibition on 
abrogating the right of action, Delegate James Tallman a lawyer from 
Bellaire stated: 
I do regard this one thing of importance, and that is the power of the 
legislature to take away from the next of kin the right of action in case 
of the death of a child or unmarried man.  You take the law as it now 
exists with reference to a man who works in a mine, and he may be 
under age or he may be an adult and in neither case does his next of 
kin, father, mother, brothers or sisters, have a right of action, and the 
amendment of the gentleman from Erie leaves to the legislature the 
power to pass a law of that kind.88 
B.  The Motivations of the Progressive Era Tort Expansionists 
Likewise, by focusing on the tort expansion of the 1950s and 
1960s, the scholarly account of tort reform is able to credit a legal 
academy unmotivated by self-interest for driving the expansion.89  
 
 86. See II PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE 
OF OHIO 1411 (1912). 
 87. See infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text. 
 88. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF OHIO, supra note 
86, at 1712. 
 89. This scholarly account can be criticized for understating the influence of academics on the 
tort retraction movement as much as it overstates the role of academics in tort expansion.  Several 
scholars have argued in favor of tort retraction.  See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges and the 
Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 135-36 (2001) (proposing increased 
judicial discretion over punitive damage awards as well as eliminating punitive damages based on 
environmental and safety risks); George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U, L, 
REV. 1, 22-36 (1987) (proposing that standards of liability focus on accident reduction); Steven A. 
Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Accident Law 231 (1987). Indeed, George Priest has identified 
“academic efforts to reexamine [tort] law” as one of the two reasons that “serious and systematic 
reform of modern tort law is inevitable.” George L. Priest, The Inevitability of Tort Reform, 26 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 701, 701 (1992); see also Manzer, supra note 1 at 629 (1986) (“Although the ‘insurance 
crisis’ was the most widely publicized factor that led states to adopt tort reform legislation 
measures, state legislators also were responding to scholarship indicating that the tort system failed 
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Contrary to this account, the history surrounding the struggle for 
legislative tort expansion demonstrates the political nature of 
Progressive (and Populist) tort expansion.  For example, in her book, 
“Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State 1877-
1917,” Professor Sanders chronicles this struggle and describes a 
coalition of multiple interests that ultimately brought about federal 
legislative reform.90  She identifies three groups responsible for 
legislative tort expansion.  First, she identifies a group of middle class 
reformers or “urban social intelligentsia.”91 This group most closely 
resembles the detached legal academy that the current scholarly account 
credits with the tort expansion of the 1950s and 1960s in that these 
middle class reformers appear unmotivated by any economic self-
interest.92  However, she also identifies a group of labor interests and a 
group of “periphery agrarian” interests composed of farmers in the 
southern, plains and western states.93  She describes how legislative 
expansion of tort rights was a product of a consensus of these groups.  
For instance, she notes that agrarian states were the first to legislatively 
abrogate common law defenses in workplace accident cases.94 
In contrast, Progressive Era reformers sought but were unable to 
obtain federal workers compensation legislation for railroad employees 
because this coalition fell part.  Initially, a coalition of labor unions, 
middle class reformers and railroad interests along with rural interests 
supported a bill that would have abrogated an employee’s private cause 
of action for railroad workplace injuries and replaced it with an 
administrative compensation scheme.95  Reported estimates predicted 
that the administrative system would increase the amounts paid by 
railroads for workplace injuries by 25% and eliminate litigation 
transaction costs bore by injured workers.96  After labor unions began to 
withdraw their support for the bill on the grounds that it was too 
 
to achieve its objectives and therefore should be substantially modified or even eliminated.”); but 
see Note, Common Sense, supra note 47 at 1766 (arguing that scholars have “overestimated the 
influence of legal scholarship on tort reform”). 
 90. SANDERS, supra note 59, at 373, 375. 
 91. Id. at 375. 
 92. Id.  Indeed, Professor Sanders holds out Louis Brandeis as an example of the urban-based 
intellectuals she describes.  Id. at 3. 
 93. Id. at 328, 373-75. 
 94. Id. at 371-72.  Professors Friedman and Ladinsky similarly note that the first such liability 
statutes were enacted in agrarian states.  They conclude that the timing “suggests. . .that some of 
these statutes were connected with the general revolt of farmers against the power of the railroad 
companies.”  Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 57 at 62-64. 
 95. Id. at 373. 
 96. Id. 
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beneficial to railroads, several Democratic congressmen from these 
periphery agrarian states withdrew their support for the legislation.97  
These congressmen ultimately were able to block adoption of the bill.  
Professor Sanders notes that these congressmen objected to the bill on 
the grounds that compensation was too low and that it precluded any 
judicial remedy.98 These congressmen offered amendments to the bill 
that would have allowed injured workers to opt out of the administrative 
scheme and seek a common law remedy and would have preserved state 
court jurisdiction over such tort suits.99  Professor Sanders also observes 
that many of these congressmen were plaintiffs’ attorneys who 
represented railroad workers in lawsuits against railroads as a 
“significant part of their practices.”100 
At the Ohio convention at least some of the strongest proponents 
for tort expansion were economically motivated actors.  For instance, 
one of the most forceful advocates for Proposal 240 to prohibit caps on 
wrongful death damages was D. F. Anderson, an apparent plaintiffs’ 
attorney101 and delegate from Youngstown. 
C.  The Role of the Would-Be Tort Retractors 
While the scholarly account of tort reform overlooks the political 
activities of the early tort expansion movement, the scholarly account 
utterly disregards any of the early activities of tort retractors.  Contrary 
to the perception left by the scholarly account corporate, professional 
and insurance interests were not absent from the early struggle for tort 
expansion.  Instead, predecessors-in-interest to the current tort retractors 
sought legislative measures similar to those sought by the tort retractors 
of today as early as the late Nineteenth Century. These predecessors-in-
interest also resisted efforts to legislatively expand tort expansion. 
Finally, tort retractors challenged legislative tort expansion in the courts. 
1.  The Legislative Activities of Early Tort Retractors 
In the mid and late Nineteenth Century, corporate interests wielded 
significant power in state legislatures.  Indeed, many Progressive Era 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 374. 
 100. Id. at 373-74. 
 101. Delegate Anderson described his legal experience as follows: “Now, I have had some 
experience—I suppose I have had more experience where the individual is on one side and the 
corporation on the other than most here.”  PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF OHIO, supra note 86, at 1411. 
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reforms evidenced a distrust of legislatures because of the influence that 
corporations held over legislators.  Many of the most recognizable 
Progressive Era innovations attempted to make legislative bodies more 
accountable to the general public rather than corporate interests.  For 
example, Progressives were instrumental in bringing about the 
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, providing for the direct 
election of U.S. Senators.102  Progressives argued that direct election was 
necessary to make the Senate responsive to the popular will.  They 
contended that appointment of Senators by state legislatures had made 
senators beholden to corporate interests because corporate interests 
wielded strong influence over the state legislators who selected 
senators.103  Most notably, in a series of articles titled “Treason of the 
Senate,” one leading Progressive Era reformer attempted to document 
the influence of corporate contributions on the voting records of many 
sitting senators.104 
Progressives advocated direct democracy measures such as 
initiative, referendum and recall as the centerpiece of progressivism.  
Indeed, many states adopted such measures during the Progressive 
period.105  These measures allowed citizens to bypass the legislature and 
enact legislation themselves or repeal statutes enacted by the legislature.  
This type of direct democracy was seen as a counterbalance to corporate 
influence over legislators.  For example, in the 1912 Constitutional 
Convention, Ohio adopted initiative and referendum. In a pamphlet 
prepared by the President of the Convention for the U.S. House of 
Representatives, the President described adoption of the initiative and 
referendum provisions as follows: 
Faith in the initiative and referendum is the acid test of the progressive.  
Ohio’s vote upon this amendment will be heralded far and wide. If it 
were defeated Wall Street would go into ecstasies of delight.  If, on 
September 3, the initiative and referendum amendment is adopted by 
an impressive majority, the returns will come like the handwriting 
upon the wall to those who revel at the feast of privilege. . . . It will be 
the beginning of the end of the rule of big interests.106 
Corporate interests wielded some of this influence to win tort 
 
 102. BLOOMFIELD, supra note 56, at 43. 
 103. Id. at 43. 
 104. Id. at 43-44. 
 105. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 2 § 8-9 (1849), amended by CAL. CONST. art. 2 § (1911); 
COLO. CONST. art. V § 1 (1876); MO. CONST. art. 3 § 49 (1908); OKLA. CONST. art. 5 § 1 (1907). 
 106. HERBERT S. BIGELOW, NEW CONSTITUTION FOR OHIO: AN EXPLANATION OF THE WORK 
OF OHIO’S FOURTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 11 (1912). 
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retraction measures and to successfully block or limit tort expansion in 
state legislatures.  In some states, railroad and other corporate interests 
won shortened statutes of limitation in personal injury actions.  Tort 
retractors blocked, stalled or weakened workers’ compensation 
legislation.  Indeed, many commentators contend that most Progressive 
Era legislation succeeded only after significant corporate input and 
ultimately represented a compromise between corporate and reform 
interests.107 
Ohio’s experience followed suit.  In Ohio, for example, mining 
interests blocked Progressive efforts to strengthen mine safety laws.  At 
the turn of the century, Ohio mine safety laws were relatively lax as 
compared to the laws of other states in which significant mining 
activities were conducted.108  Reformers were able to garner only 
insufficient legislative support to strengthen the mine safety laws to 
levels in keeping with reasonable standards.109  In March 1908, 
reformers ultimately succeeded in persuading the legislature to create a 
commission to investigate mine safety and make recommendations.110  
That commission eventually submitted an entirely redrafted and 
strengthened mining code to the General Assembly which unanimously 
voted to enact the new code.111  However, reformers were unable to 
garner legislative support for the commission until state mine operators 
 
 107. See, e.g., BLOOMFIELD, supra note 56, at 47.  “In fact, the constitutional changes inspired 
by Progressivism stopped far short of creating a ‘mobocracy.’  Although muckraking journals hailed 
the passage of each new regulatory measure as a victory for ‘the people,’ lobbyists for major 
industries often helped to draft such legislation and to blunt its intended effects.”  Id.  See also 
SANDERS, supra note 59, at 372-74 (noting that employers had come to recognize a need for 
workers compensation by the time that Congress considered federal workers’ compensation 
legislation; that railroad interests supported federal legislation creating a workers’ compensation 
system for railroad workers; and that agrarian Democrats rather than railroad interests ultimately 
defeated the proposed workers’ compensation system because the agrarian Democrats perceived the 
law as too favorable to the railroads); Professor Friedman and Ladinsky observe that by 1911 the 
National Association of Manufacturers perceived of workers’ compensation as inevitable and 
sought to play a role in shaping the law.  The authors conclude that “[i]n short, when workmen’s 
compensation became law, as a solution to the industrial accident problem, it did so on terms 
acceptable to industry.”  Friedman and Ladinsky, supra note 57 at 69. 
 108. WILLIAM GRAEBNER, COAL-MINING SAFETY IN THE PROGRESSIVE PERIOD: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM 77 (1976).  “In 1900 Ohio had the vaguest safety legislation of 
the major coal-mining states.” Id. 
 109. Id. at 77-78.  Professor Graebner notes several proposals that were adopted by only one 
house of the General Assembly or were killed in committee.  Id. 
 110. Id. at 78-79.  Professor Graebner notes that the Ohio state chief inspector had 
recommended forming a commission to investigate mine safety and reformulate mine safety laws 
four years before the General Assembly ultimately adopted the proposal.  Id. 
 111. Id. at 79. 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 4, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss4/4
JANUTISFINAL.DOC 2/26/2007  9:31:01 AM 
2006] OVERLOOKED LEGACY OF THE PROGRESSIVES 963 
evidenced support for the commission.112 
Populist Era reformers had won enactment of a mine safety bill as 
early as 1880.113  However, mine operators won concessions to this law.  
For example, the mine safety code provided a cause of action for 
workers injured as a result of a violation of the safety code or for the 
families of workers killed as a result of a violation.114  The right to a 
cause of action in the mining code eliminated wrongful death claims by 
unmarried mine workers and underage mine workers.115  Such claims 
would have been permitted under the generally applicable wrongful 
death statute.116 
Likewise, corporate interests were able to obtain concessions in 
Ohio’s workers’ compensation act.  The act permitted employers to self-
insure.  If an employer was able to post an adequate bond, it did not have 
to pay insurance premiums into the state compensation fund.  Instead, an 
employer posting the requisite bond paid compensation directly to an 
injured worker.  In this way, the employer only needed to pay if an 
employee was actually injured.  This provision inured to the benefit of 
larger employers.117 
2.  Judicial Challenges to Tort Expansion 
Much like today’s tort expansionists, early tort retractors 
challenged the legislative victories of the Progressive Era tort 
expansionists in the state and federal courts.118  For example, corporate 
and railroad interests challenged statutes abrogating the fellow-servant 
rule and the assumption of the risk defense on equal protection grounds 
and state single-subject legislation limitations.119  In response to a 
 
 112. Id.  Professor Graebner opines that large scale mine explosions in West Virginia and 
Pennsylvania triggered the industry’s interest in mine safety and explained the nature and scope of 
these explosions.  Id. at 15, 18, 78. 
 113. Id. at 77. 
 114. 101 OHIO LAWS 52, 86-87 (1910); GRAEBNER, supra note 110, at 77 (characterizing this 
right of action as a “redemptive” feature of the mine safety code). 
 115. 101 OHIO LAWS 52, 86-87 (1910) (restricting recovery to “the widow and lineal heirs” of 
a person killed by a violation of the Act’s safety provisions).  See also Harris v. Rail & River Coal 
Mining Co., 87 Ohio St. 450, 451 (1913), (sustaining the dismissal of a wrongful death action 
brought by the estate of a 16 year old killed in a mining accident on behalf of his parents). 
 116. 49 OHIO LAWS 117 (1851). 
 117. Vayto, 28 Ohio Dec. at 413.  “These sections were evidently inserted in the act to placate 
a few large employers who are able to organize and maintain special accident or claim 
departments.”  Id. 
 118. JOHN FABIAN WITT, LESSONS FROM HISTORY: STATE CONSTITUTIONS, AMERICAN TORT 
LAW, AND THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS 4-5 (2004); see also ELY, supra note 56, at 215. 
 119. WITT, supra note 120, at 31-32. 
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challenge by railroad interests, the U.S. Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional the original version of the Federal Employers’ Liability 
Act.  Tort retractors also challenged workers’ compensation statutes.120  
In one of the most high profile decisions of the time, the New York 
Court of Appeals struck down New York’s first workers’ compensation 
statute.  In Ives v. South Buffalo Railway, the Buffalo Railway 
challenged New York’s statute on the grounds that it violated due 
process.121  The New York Court of Appeals agreed, concluding that the 
statute violated due process because it required the employer to 
compensate the employee for his injuries even when the negligence of 
the employee, rather than the employer, caused the injuries.122 Indeed, 
several Progressive Era reform measures evidenced as much distrust of 
the judiciary, in particular the federal judiciary, as they evidenced 
distrust of the legislature,123 and conventional wisdom among historians 
has been that federal, and sometimes state courts, were sympathetic to 
tort retractors’ claims.124 
Again Ohio’s experience mirrored this general pattern.  For 
example, corporate and railroad interests challenged the Norris Act and 
other statutes expanding common law liability and abrogating the 
common law defenses of the fellow-servant rule and assumption of the 
risk.  Corporate interests also challenged the original Ohio workers’ 
compensation statute.  In response, the Ohio Supreme Court questioned 
the validity of the law, ultimately upholding the law only because of its 
voluntary nature.125  The Creamery decision challenged the 
constitutional basis of workers’ compensation enough that Progressive 
reformers sought and obtained a constitutional amendment expressly 
authorizing the legislature to enact a workers’ compensation statute at 
the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1912.126 
 
 120. WITT, supra note 120, at 37-43; Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective 
Legislation during the Progressive Era: A Reevaluation, 72 JOURNAL OF AMERICAN HISTORY 63, 
86-88 (1985). 
 121. Ives v. South Buffalo Rwy., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911). 
 122. Id. at 441. 
 123. For example, President Theodore Roosevelt called for the direct recall of judicial 
decisions.  Some recall proposals allowed for the recall of popularly elected judges.  Id. 
 124. Urofsky, supra note 122, at 63 (noting the conventional wisdom but arguing that state 
courts were sympathetic to Progressive Era reforms). 
 125. State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 97 N.E. 602 (Ohio 1912). 
 126. The delegates adopted Proposal No. 24, authorizing the legislature to enact a workers’ 
compensation scheme.  PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 
OHIO, supra note 86, at 1347.  In introducing Proposal No. 24, Delegate Cordes remarked: 
Proposal No. 24 undertakes to write into the constitution of Ohio a constitutional 
provision making secure workmen’s compensation law passed by the last legislature, and 
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D.  The Early Debate About Tort Expansion 
The arguments that these predecessor tort retractors advanced in 
support of tort retraction and against tort expansion mirror the arguments 
that the current tort retractors advance in favor of tort reform.  For 
example, the debate at the Ohio Constitutional Convention of 1912 
surrounding Proposal 240 to constitutionally prohibit the legislature 
from statutorily limiting damages in wrongful death actions sounds 
eerily familiar to debates concerning current tort reform measures such 
as statutory damage caps on non-economic and punitive damages.  The 
reasons advanced by the proponents and opponents of Proposal 240 
mirror the reasons advanced by proponents and opponents of damage 
caps today. 
H.M. Crites, a grain dealer and delegate from Circleville, opposed 
the measure, arguing that limitless liability could bankrupt small 
manufacturers: 
We are not all corporations doing business in this state and they are not 
all big corporations who are doing business.  The Proposal No. 240 has 
in it no limitation.  It says that the amount of recovery shall not be 
subject to statutory limitations.  Take some small manufacturing 
concern, organized by a man of small means.  Say a man has been 
working twenty or thirty years and he has made $5,000 or $10,000.  He 
goes into a manufacturing business and after running a few weeks he 
may have an accident, not from his own negligence, but still the case 
may be decided against the manufacturer, and it will take every dollar 
the man has earned for twenty or thirty years.  It would bankrupt 
him.127 
Likewise, opponents argued that Proposal No. 240 would drive up 
insurance premiums to prohibitive levels. James W. Halfhill, a lawyer 
and delegate from Lima, argued: 
When you start into a manufacturing business, whether you are an 
individual or a big corporation, one of the fixed expenses incident to 
that business is the carrying of all kinds of insurance that you can get.  
One of this kind frequently carried is casualty insurance.  What 
insurance company can write casualty insurance except at an 
 
declared constitutional by the Ohio supreme court by a vote of 4 to 2.  Labor asks that 
this proposal be adopted, because we believe that by writing it into the constitution it 
will make it possible to continue this beneficial measure without any further fear of a 
constitutional question being raised again on this matter. 
Id. at 1346. 
 127. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF OHIO, supra note 
86, at 1708. 
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exorbitant premium, where there is no limit to the possible liability?128 
Delegate Halfill also argued that the proposal would disrupt any 
workers’ compensation law enacted pursuant to the 1912 Constitution:129 
But I call your attention to the fact that under workmen’s 
compensation laws the commissioners that control the fund have to be 
governed by the same theory that casualty insurance companies are 
governed by, and they have premiums of a certain amount in certain 
kinds of factories, according to the class of risk.  Where the risk is 
great, the premium would be higher; where the risk was less, the 
premium would be less, so that you absolutely throw down the bars so 
far as safeguards are concerned and take away the foundation rule 
which permits courts at the present to cut down verdicts if excessive, 
and you have established a rule whereby the commissioners of the 
workmen’s compensation fund are not able to figure and to make a 
right premium.130 
Finally, opponents argued that potentially limitless liability would 
place undue settlement pressure on defendants.  H.G. Redington, a 
lawyer131 and delegate from Elvira, argued: 
[I] know from observation and experience that nine out of ten of 
wrongful-death cases are settled and do not get into the court.  First we 
bluff settlements in a good many of the cases.  We try to get by the 
court.  We nearly always trust the jury if we have the other side and we 
try to block everything so as to let it get by the court.  The purpose of 
this whole proceeding is for some attorney who has the side against the 
corporation or persons blamed.  This is wanted to make a bluff for a 
great big settlement so that a small corporation or an individual who 
has been sued would rather pay a larger amount of money than to take 
 
 128. Id. at 1709. 
Do you want to wipe out corporations? . . . If you put this thing in you will break up a 
good many institutions attempting to do a legitimate business.  Today we have certain 
definite rules to follow in determining the damages in any particular case.  Under these 
rules the employer can get insurance and, as well stated, no insurance company would 
dare to take the hazard under this provision that is now offered, or if they did take it they 
would want to raise the rates. 
Id. at 1713 (comments of Delegate Redington). 
 129. The delegates adopted Proposal No. 24, authorizing the legislature to enact a workers’ 
compensation scheme.  See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. 
 130. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF OHIO, supra note 
86, at 1710. 
 131. Delegate Redington purported to serve both plaintiffs and defendants.  “For at least 
twenty-five years I have been interested on both sides of personal injury cases.”  Id. at 1713. 
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the chances of a jury trial.132 
Proponents of Proposal No. 240, like current tort expanders, argued 
that judicial review of jury verdicts provided sufficient protection from 
excessive verdicts.  For example, D. F. Anderson, an apparent plaintiffs’ 
attorney133 and delegate from Youngstown, argued: 
Now it may be said that the corporations, or those causing death, 
would not be properly protected, but they are protected, first in the trial 
court by a motion for a new trial, which goes to the learned judge, and 
the judge can cut down a verdict to any sum he thinks proper.  Not 
only that, but if the common pleas judge fails to cut down the amount 
given by the jury then the circuit court or the court of appeals has the 
absolute right to cut down the amount, provided the learned judges 
believe it to be too large.134 
Delegate Anderson later continued: 
The point I want to demonstrate under the laws of Ohio is that no 
hardship can arrive; I mean with the limitation being taken 
off . . . . Under our statutes it is provided that if an amount indicates 
passion or prejudice the judge must give a new trial, and if the 
common pleas judge fails to do his duty it goes to three learned 
gentlemen . . . the court of appeals . . .Then it can go to the court of 
appeals where the three judges are sitting.  Two of them may cut down 
the verdict of the jury that is influenced by passion or prejudice if they 
conclude that it is too large, and they can cut it down to any figure they 
want.135 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CURRENT TORT REFORM DEBATE 
As the above review of the Progressive Era’s struggles over tort 
reform reflects, tort law in this country has developed through a push-
and-pull process driven by actors with competing economic interests.  
This push and pull has taken place in the legislative and judicial 
branches, and tort law represents an amalgamation of the efforts of these 
two institutions.  By neglecting consideration of the Progressive Era 
struggles over tort reform, the scholarly account of current tort reform 
fails to capture this dynamic history.  This neglect of early efforts at tort 
 
 132. Id. at 1713. 
 133. Delegate Anderson described his legal experience as follows: “Now, I have had some 
experience—I suppose I have had more experience where the individual is on one side and the 
corporation on the other than most here.”  Id. at 1411. 
 134. Id. at 1412. 
 135. Id. at 1707-08. 
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reform produces several results. 
First, by disregarding these Progressive Era struggles over tort 
reform, the scholarly account may inadvertently bolster current tort 
retraction.  Current tort retractors claim that “reform” is needed because 
the civil justice system is “in crisis.”  They contend that runaway juries 
award excessive damages to plaintiffs with only minimal injuries.136  
They also contend that overzealous plaintiffs’ attorneys recruit clients 
with only minimal injuries and use past excessive verdicts to pressure 
defendants into settlement.137  Tort retractors contend that the costs of 
these frivolous suits and settlements drive up insurance premiums and 
drive out of business providers of necessary products and services.138  
Implicit in these arguments is the assumption that this problem is new—
that the tort system was functioning properly but now has gone awry.  
Further, they contend the system has gone awry, in part, because judges 
have expanded tort rights too far.139 
As described above, the current scholarly account suggests that as 
tort expanders won battles in the courts, tort retractors took to the state 
and national legislatures as well as to the “court of public opinion” to 
push back against this expansion.  In so doing, the scholarly account of 
tort expansion leaves out entirely the role that corporate, professional 
and insurance interests played in that tort expansion.  In the scholarly 
story of tort reform, these actors emerge only after the consequences of 
tort expansion have materialized and only as a reaction to tort expansion 
in courts.  Further, when they do appear, they emerge to wage their 
battles in a new arena—the legislature.  The scholarly account suggests 
 
 136. See, e.g., American Tort Reform Assoc., ATRA’s Mission: Real Justice in Our Courts, 
http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited 4/4/2006).  The American Tort Reform Association is a non 
profit organization that lobbies for tort reform legislation and campaigns for pro-tort reform political 
candidates.  In describing the mission of the ATRA, the organization’s website describes what it 
perceives to be the crisis in the civil justice system.  Id.  See also U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
Institute for Legal Reform, Issues: Medical Liability, available at http://www.instituteforlegal 
reform.com/issues/index.php?p=medical (last visited 4/4/2006). 
 137. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 138. 
 138. Id.; see also Institute for Legal Reform, About ILR: Who We Are, available at http://www. 
instituteforlegalreform.com/about/  (March 1, 2006). 
America’s legal crisis is putting employees out of work, raising consumer prices, driving 
down shareholder value and bankrupting companies.  Many plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
exploiting flaws in our legal system in pursuit of jackpot justice.  Meanwhile, frivolous 
lawsuits clog our courts, denying those most deserving of justice their right to a speedy 
trial. 
Id. 
 139. See, e.g., American Tort Reform Association, Judicial Hellholes 2005 (March 1, 2006), 
available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/ (listing “the willingness of courts to expand 
liability through novel theories” as a factor that contributes to a “judicial hellhole” designation). 
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that this entrée into the political arena was a new approach.140 
By painting the reaction of tort retractors as a novel reaction to 
concerns raised by tort expansion, scholars may inadvertently add 
credence to the tort retractors’ contentions that the problems caused by 
judicial tort expansion in the 1950s and 1060s are new problems.  If tort 
expansion had posed similar concerns sooner, tort retractors would have 
come forward to raise concerns before the tort expansion of the 1950s 
and 1960s.  Because they have not raised concerns before, perhaps the 
tort expansion of the 1950s and 1960s did raise novel concerns. 
Contrary to the perception left by the scholarly account, however, 
corporate, professional and insurance interests were not absent from the 
struggle for tort expansion.  Instead, predecessors-in-interest to the 
current tort retractors sought legislative measures similar to those sought 
by the tort retractors of today as early as the late Nineteenth Century and 
resisted tort expansion in the legislature.  Additionally, tort retractors 
sought to set aside legislatively expanded tort rights in the courts.  
Moreover, their arguments in opposition to tort expansion and in favor 
of tort retraction have remained relatively static from these early battles 
until today.  As discussed above, the arguments advanced by Progressive 
Era tort retractors in the political institutions mirror the arguments 
advanced by tort retractors today.141  Additionally, early tort retractors 
challenged legislative measures expanding tort rights on some of the 
very same grounds that current tort retractors claim courts use to strike 
down legislative measures restricting tort rights.142  Viewed in the full 
 
 140. See Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 47, at 1021. 
Unlike previous reform efforts that sought to change rules of law through case-by case 
adjudication in the courts, the self-styled tort “reform” movement pursued a much 
grander vision: transforming the cultural understanding of civil litigation. . .by attacking 
the system itself.  Success would be measured not by remaking the rules of law through 
conventional litigation or even legislation but by changes to the public perception of how 
the civil justice system operates. 
Id. 
[T]he contemporary political battles over tort reform can be explicitly linked to the 
politics of an earlier era that at one time was confined to debates in the courtroom.  By 
bringing debates over substantive law into the political arena, tort reformers have made 
explicit what was once implicit: competing forces that marshal arguments from political, 
economic, moral and social theory shape the content of tort rules. 
Id. at 1024-25. See also Page, supra note 49 at 654-55 (distinguishing the “new tort reform” from 
the tort expansion of the 1950s and 1960s by describing the new tort reform as “a political attack on 
tort law in the legislative arena”). 
 141. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.  
 142. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text. See also American Tort Reform 
Association, Judicial Nullification of State Civil Justice Reform (March 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7350 (listing state decisions that have struck down 
recent tort reform measures) (last visited 6/6/2006). 
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light of history, the current tort retractors seems less like the four 
horsemen predicting the apocalypse and more like chicken-little ever 
predicting the sky is falling. 
Second, by focusing on judicial tort expansion in the 1950s and 
1960s, tort expansionist have neglected what may turn out to be the most 
powerful reform achieved by the Progressive Era tort expansionists and 
the most powerful weapon for those seeking to preserve tort expansion 
from challenges by current tort retractors.  Opponents of current tort 
retraction, in part, have challenged the validity of tort retraction 
measures such as damage caps under state constitutions.143  As Ohio’s 
experience demonstrates, thus far, the debate about the constitutionality 
of tort reform measures such as damage caps has focused primarily on 
traditional areas of constitutional inquiry such as due process, equal 
protection, separation of powers, the right to a jury trial and the right to 
open access to the courts.  Further, the debate has taken place without 
much serious consideration of the historical origins of these state 
constitutional provisions and, instead, has focused on other normative 
theories of constitutional interpretation. 
However, as discussed above, Progressive Era reformers sought and 
obtained constitutional amendments designed to preserve tort expansion 
from the very same types of tort retraction sought today.  For example, 
in Ohio, Progressive Era reformers sought and won a constitutional 
amendment to prohibit the legislature from statutorily limiting damages 
in wrongful death actions.144  Further, these reformers sought such a 
reform in response to an existing statutory cap on damages in wrongful 
death actions.145  This provision on its face would seem to preclude 
damage caps in wrongful death actions.  Indeed, as a testament to the 
continuing vitality of this provision, each of the contemporary Ohio tort 
reform statutes has contained a damage cap but has excluded wrongful 
death actions from the reach of the damage cap. 
Moreover, the debates surrounding this provision may shed light on 
the meaning of the traditional areas of constitutional inquiry.  Supporters 
of Proposal 240, supported the measure, in part, because they believed it 
was necessary to equalize recovery in personal injury and wrongful 
death actions.  For example, Delegate Bowdle remarked: 
I expect to assist this provision with my vote . . . .Today in the state of 
Ohio it is far more profitable for a negligent corporation to kill a man 
 
 143. See supra note 7, and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.  
 145. Id. 
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outright than to injure him. 
* * * 
I think we should see to it that this proposal is incorporated in the 
constitution so that those who are left may in some fair way be 
compensated for those who are taken away.  Under the present 
condition it would be very much more profitable for a motorman 
busily engaged in serving his employers, whenever he saw there was 
no reasonable chance for one imperilled [sic] to escape, to turn on 
power and kill the person rather than injure him.146 
Likewise, supporters emphasized the statutory nature of wrongful 
death actions in explaining why such a statutory prohibition was 
necessary.  For example, in explaining why other states had adopted 
constitutional amendments prohibiting legislatures from abrogating 
wrongful death claims, Delegate Anderson remarked: 
In the first place, the right to recover for wrongful death does not exist 
in common law.  It is entirely created by statute.  Consequently, I 
presume that was in the minds of the constitution makers when they 
placed these words preventing the abrogation of the rights of recovery 
for wrongful death in the constitution.147 
Delegate Peck suggested the Ohio Constitution needed to be 
amended to include Proposal 240 because recovery for wrongful death 
had never “reached the level of natural justice” but instead was merely a 
matter of legislative grace.148  Including Proposal 240 in the Constitution 
would elevate the right to recovery for wrongful death to a foundational 
law of natural justice.149  These comments suggest that the proponents of 
this measure believed that Proposal 240 was necessary because the 
legislature had greater ability to restrict recovery in wrongful death 
actions because wrongful death actions were statutorily created rights.  
Conversely, the proponents may have understood the legislature to have 
limited ability to restrict remedies available for common law torts. 
Finally, the bulk of the discussion surrounding Proposal 240 dealt 
with the recovery of damages for non-pecuniary losses.  Indeed, the 
 
 146. PROCEEDINGS & DEBATES OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 86, 
at 1710-11.  See also, id. at 1713, for the following remarks by Delegate Dunn: “It seems that this 
proposal is another one in the direction of genuine reform.. . .It is a fact that some of the railroads 
would rather kill a person than wound that person because the damages would be far less.” 
 147. Id at 1707. 
 148. Id. at 1712. 
 149. See id. 
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proponents of the proposal seemed to believe that the then-existing cap 
on damages prevented recovery for non-pecuniary losses and that 
recovery of such losses was necessary for full compensation.  For 
example, Delegate Peck argued: 
Would not natural justice say that whoever causes the wrongful death 
of another shall compensate those who have lost by his wrongful act?  
What does compensation mean?  It means pay, and that would be the 
amount lost . . . . No statutory limitation can be fixed which will 
authorize persons bringing that kind of action to recover the amount 
they ought to recover—in other words, enough to repay them for what 
they have lost by the death of that relative. 
. . .there are phases of the situation in which the sentimental aspect of 
which Mr. Bowdle speaks has come in and could not be kept out, when 
a man is injured and sues for compensation and he recovers 
compensation for his suffering.  It is a suggestive matter.  His feelings, 
his sufferings, his pain, his internal injuries—for those there would be 
no recovery.  There should be a recovery which would fully 
compensate for every sort of injury, for the loss of companionship, the 
loss of good advice, the loss of friendly assistance and a thousand and 
one things that an affectionate relative can render to another.  These 
are the things that the jury can estimate, and to say that the damage 
should be limited only to the pecuniary loss is to say that full 
compensation is not to be made.150 
Taken as a whole, these comments suggest that the proponents of 
Proposal 240 felt that it was necessary to ensure full compensation in 
wrongful death actions and that full compensation included recovery for 
non-economic losses.  Further, they suggest that a constitutional 
amendment was necessary to protect recovery of these losses in 
wrongful death actions because such recovery was available as a matter 
of common law in personal injury actions. 
These comments, in turn, could shed light on the meaning of Ohio’s 
open courts provision and separation of powers doctrine.  Additionally, 
the inclusion of this provision could bolster equal protection arguments.  
For example, the principles underlying the amendment demonstrate that 
the framers of the Ohio Constitution intended to provide full recovery 
for tort victims and that full recovery included full compensation for 
non-economic as well as economic losses.  Further, the debates 
surrounding the adoption of Proposal 240 suggest that the drafters 
 
 150. See id. 1711 (setting forth remarks of Delegate Bowdle); id. at 1713 (setting forth remarks 
of Delegate Dunn). 
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believed that only a jury subject to judicial review could fully assess the 
value of those damages.  This may demonstrate that the Ohio 
Constitution implicitly recognizes the right to a jury determination of 
non-economic damages as a fundamental right. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The scholarly account hopes to distinguish and elevate tort 
expansion over tort retraction by contrasting the process through which 
each was achieved. The scholarly account of tort reform depicts the 
current tort retraction efforts as a primarily political movement driven by 
the economic self-interest of its proponents.  In contrast, it depicts tort 
expansion as a judicial process led by legal scholars unmotivated by 
self-interest.  Those seeking to distinguish tort expansion from tort 
retraction would be better served to do so on normative grounds rather 
than on procedural grounds for several reasons.  First, the scholarly 
account paints an accurate but incomplete picture.  By overlooking the 
efforts to achieve tort expansion during the Progressive Era, this account 
overlooks the political nature of tort expansion.  Instead of a completely 
judicial expansion, tort expansion in the Progressive Era was a political 
movement led by interested actors as well as detached reformists.  In so 
doing, this account inadvertently bolsters the current tort retraction by 
diverting attention from the relatively constant nature of objections and 
concerns advanced by tort retractors.  Finally, the scholarly account also 
overlooks the important political contributions Progressive Era tort 
reformers made to state constitutions and the effects that those 
constitutional contributions may have had on the balance of power 
among the legislature, the judiciary and the jury with respect to common 
law tort remedies.  Ironically, this account has caused the defenders of 
tort expansion to overlook what may be the most powerful defense of 
tort expansion. 
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